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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Climate change poses a threat to several internationally
recognized human rights, including the rights to food, a
livelihood, health, a healthy environment, access to water
and the rights to work and to cultural life. Actions taken
to mitigate and adapt to the adverse impacts of climate
change have to be centred on human rights. In negotiations
for a binding international climate change instrument,
nation states have been called upon to fully respect human
rights in all climate-related actions. As important as this
demand is, there is also the need to describe and plan how
human rights can be integrated into international, national,
subnational and corporate climate change strategies. This
paper analyzes a few examples of national, subnational
and corporate climate change policies to show how they
have either enshrined human rights principles, or failed
to do so.
It is argued that existing national, subnational and
corporate climate change policies make little direct
reference to human rights norms. This paper examines
the question that naturally arises: how are human rights
concerns being integrated into those policies? This paper
also examines the challenge of integrating human rights
principles in climate change actions. It first looks at climate
change in the context of larger environmental issues that
have considerable human rights consequences. Then it
highlights the challenges of bridging the normative gap
in international law — in other words, the inadequate
legal provision for protection of human rights with regard
to environmental rights in general, and climate change
more specifically, and how this might guide domestic
climate change action. The paper concludes that climate
change policies, if they are to respect all human rights,
must actually use human rights language to articulate
adaptation or mitigation measures.

INTRODUCTION
In the 2010 Cancun Agreement to the Conference of the
Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), it was provided that
“Parties should, in all climate-related actions, fully respect
human rights” (UNFCCC 2011). The same document also
affirmed the rights-based safeguards to be applied when
financing and undertaking activities under the Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
(REDD+) framework. These safeguards, it must be noted,
were informed by the experiences of local and indigenous
peoples under UN-REDD, which became REDD+ as a
result of the bottom-up efforts to catalyze human rights
protection for the most vulnerable, whose interests were
apparently being ignored up to that time in the UNFCCC
process (Kant, Chaliha and Shuirong 2011; Doolittle 2010).
On October 17, 2014, mandate holders under the special
procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council

jointly addressed an open letter to the UNFCCC parties,
calling upon them “to include language in the 2015 climate
agreement that provides that the parties shall, in all
climate change-related actions, respect, protect, promote,
and fulfill human rights for all” (Mandate-Holders of the
Human Rights Council 2014). This call departed noticeably
from the language of “respect” in the Cancun Agreements
mentioned above, as well as from the COP 21 negotiating
text identified below, to prescribe additional substantive
state responsibilities (“protect,” “promote” and “fulfill”)
in designing an international climate agreement.
As well, in the Streamlined and Consolidated Text the
preamble noted that, “Parties should ensure in all climate
change related actions full respect of all human rights”
(UNFCCC 2015). The text further recognized that, “all
actions on climate change shall significantly contribute to
the post-2015 development agenda of the United Nations
with a particular focus on human rights, good governance,
gender equality and the needs of particularly vulnerable
groups” (ibid.).
As the COP21 Paris meeting draws closer, there are
indications that a binding agreement may not be achieved,
and the language of human rights may be excluded
altogether from whatever agreement is reached. Rather than
the streamlined text mentioned above, a set of three tools
have been issued by the co-chairs of COP21, anticipating
the most likely scenario for the final negotiations. The first
is a draft of issues that could form an agreement in Paris.
This draft is full of the language of “vulnerabilities.” Not
even once does it mention “human rights.” The second tool
is a draft of issues that could form part of the decisions, with
one extended preambular paragraph that emphasizes “the
importance of respecting and taking into account human
rights, gender equality, the rights of indigenous peoples,
intergenerational concerns, and the needs of particularly
vulnerable groups, including women, children and
persons with disabilities, when taking action to address
climate change….” The last tool deals with provisions
whose placement requires additional explanation among
the parties. This tool includes a paragraph that, while it
emphasizes “full respect for all human rights,” singles out
gender responsiveness/equality, the right to development
and the rights of indigenous peoples for specific
recognition.
The inconsistent back-and-forth treatment of human rights
concerns in the pre-COP21 documents might seem to
suggest that the issue has not been considered with a great
deal of seriousness, at least not from the perspective of the
negotiating parties. This may well be the case, or it may
be an unintentional oversight. Regardless, any potential
for a lack of attention to and absence of the human rights
component in the COP21 deliberations has to be carefully
followed to ensure negotiators do not drop the ball on the
matter and thus negatively affect the outcome. Whether
described in the language of vulnerabilities or articulated
Basil Ugochukwu • 1
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in more explicit human rights terms, a combined reading
of all the pre-Paris documents indicates a concern for
human rights principles in climate change strategies.
Those principles should not be ignored in any outcome or
agreement, even if they are only general declarations of
goals. Making them essential, operational elements of the
agreement would require further articulation of specific
norms and the identification of actionable activities.

CONNECTING CLIMATE CHANGE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
Climate change puts humanity at risk and has “clear and
immediate implications for the full enjoyment of human
rights” (Kravchenko 2010; Atapattu 2002; Humphreys
2010). Combatting climate change therefore requires
actions that are focused on its impacts on human rights.
Equally as important as this expectation of integrating
human rights principles into climate change action is the
need to spell out explicit ways this expectation can be
met in international, national, subnational and corporate
climate change strategies.
According to 2014 research undertaken by the Mary
Robinson Foundation, only 12 countries (mainly from
Central America, Europe and Asia) mentioned the link
between climate change and human rights in reports
transmitted to the UNFCCC and the Human Rights Council
(HRC). In specific terms, however, the report showed that in
information presented before the HRC under the Universal
Periodic Review, 45 countries (in Central America, Africa,
Europe and Asia) referred explicitly to the human rights
impacts of climate change. At the UNFCCC, 49 countries
(in Africa, Central and South America, Europe and Asia)
clearly mentioned human rights in their submissions to
that body (Mary Robinson Foundation 2014). Neither the
United States nor Canada figured in any of these reports.
It is unclear if this is because the statistics do not cover
the two countries’ reporting period or their reports did not
actually make reference to human rights.
These figures show that even though human rights
implications are central concerns of at least some countries
in their climate change action plans, the number of
countries showing such human rights sensitivity is still too
low to warrant optimism. Given that 193 member states
of the United Nations and 195 countries have ratified
the UNFCCC, the low numbers from the Mary Robinson
Foundation reveal that the situation leaves a lot to be
desired. The language of the reports themselves is equally
important to understanding the challenges. Referring to
the human rights impacts of climate change in general
terms is clearly not the same as stating explicitly how the
human rights framework can be incorporated in climate
change mitigation and adaptation measures. There is,
therefore, the challenge to move from broad plans to the
specifics of how these goals can be achieved.
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As a practical strategy in this regard, the International Bar
Association Climate Change Justice and Human Rights
Task Force (2014) has suggested the “greening” of existing
human rights by “urging human rights bodies to recognize
that climate change impedes the full enjoyment of at least
some, if not all, human rights.” Yet questions remain as to
how specific human rights targets can be achieved under
the climate change regime. What would such general
statements about “respecting” or “greening” human rights
amount to when broken down to fine details? What does
it mean to respect all human rights in this context? What
human rights are to be respected? And is there a distinct
language with which to express respect for human rights
in climate change action?
The possibility of addressing climate change through
international human rights law has come under intense
scrutiny in recent years (Shue 2014; Roht-Arriaza 2010).
There is increasing consensus that under a general theme
of “climate justice,” existing international human rights
norms could be deployed in the fight against climate
change — to the extent that the impact of climate change
violates any of those norms (Caney 2010). Applying those
norms should not depend on an international agreement
specifically linking climate change and human rights.
Instead, the link could be made by assessing the ways
that climate change affects particular human rights norms
already recognized under international human rights law.
As has been rightly argued, “linking the climate change
negotiations and structures to existing human rights norms
enables States to use indicators and mechanisms anchored
in the well-established human rights system to address
the challenges posed by the changing climate” (Center for
International Environmental Law 2011). Establishing this
link is by no means an easy task (Doolittle 2010). The next
section explores this challenge.

ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND CLIMATE
CHANGE CLAIMS
Within the existing literature, the right to a clean
environment is sometimes differentiated from the human
right to remedies accruing from the consequences of
climate change. John Knox, the UN Special Rapporteur
on Human Rights and the Environment, is among the
scholars who have made this distinction. In a recent essay,
he divided his discussion on the international regime
for the protection of the environment within the human
rights framework into two parts. In the first part, he
examined the relationship between human rights law and
environmental protection in a general sense. In the second,
he focused specifically on the human rights implications
of climate change (Knox 2015). This distinction must be
understood if the contours of human rights claims based
on climate change are to be effectively traced.

Climate Change and Human Rights: How? Where? When?
There are therefore two lines of inquiry to examine. The
first is to determine whether a human right to a healthy
and sustainable environment has been acknowledged
in international law (Francioni 2010). The second is
to discover whether “climate law” is in the process of
becoming a new international law regime (Mayer 2013).
As will be explained below, there is no doubt that the
first question can be answered in the affirmative. This
is the case even though the protection of the right to a
healthy and sustainable environment has not developed
in a straightforward trajectory within the international
human rights law-making system. As one scholar asserts,
the relationship between international environmental law
and international human rights law is a complicated one
(Fisher 2013). The concept and understanding of a human
right to a healthy environment seems to have developed
slowly and tentatively.
In 1972, the Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment spoke of the fundamental right to
freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life “in an
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity
and well-being,” asserting that the present generation
bears “a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the
environment for present and future generations.” This
coupling of the “ecological and human rights approaches
to environmental protection” saw little progress over the
next 20 years (Francioni 2010). By the time of the Rio Earth
Summit in 1992, the human rights language had softened
considerably, shifting away from a focus on people to
“nature” and referring to human beings merely as “the
central concern of sustainable development…entitled to
a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature”
(ibid., 45).
It has been suggested that the main concern of the Rio
Declaration was “the conjugation of environmental
protection with economic development, not the
safeguarding of human rights through enhanced
environmental protection,” and that the reconciliation of
economic growth with environmental protection remains
the focus of environmental diplomacy, even after the world
adopted the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent negotiations
on global warming (ibid.). While there has been significant
international action on the climate change front, the fact
that the draft agreement for COP21 talks of a “facilitative,
non-punitive,
non-adversarial
and
non-judicial”
framework for international climate change governance,
detracts substantially from the original goal of agreeing a
binding international instrument. Granted, there are some
non-binding human rights documents (such as the United
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights) that could deal with climate change-related
concerns. If the UNFCCC process ends up with a similar
non-binding document, it could hardly be described as a
success because it defeats the stated goal of producing a
binding agreement. It bears noting that following more

than two decades of the COP process, and since the 2007
Kyoto Protocol, global emissions of greenhouse gases have
increased rather than abated, signifying a more urgent
situation.
The next section examines the normative gap in the
international legal system, the lack of protection that has
fed doubts that climate change will be treated as a human
rights concern with claimable, legal and enforceable
rights related to its impacts. While some of the gaps in
law highlight the lack of a substantive basis for claiming
violations on human rights grounds arising from climate
change, others show only the procedural limitations of
making such claims in specific legal or judicial contexts.
It is argued that there is an urgent need to strengthen
procedural safeguards where they already exist. The
larger, more important challenge is to develop substantive
normative standards for the recognition of human rights
in climate change policies at the international, national,
subnational and corporate levels.

BRIDGING THE NORMATIVE GAP IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Current international human rights law does not
recognize the impacts of climate change as the basis for
human rights claims, which means that there is a gap in
the international normative system. In other words, while
it is generally accepted that climate change has negative
impacts on a range of human rights, the international legal
system has not yet specifically assigned responsibility for
the causes of climate change on the basis of human rights
norms. For this reason, Eric Posner (2007, 1931) has argued
that “There is…no international human right to be free
of global warming or pollution per se.” In his view, “the
claim that individuals have an international human right
of some sort that is violated by the emission of greenhouse
gases, and that such a right should be vindicated in human
rights litigation, is not normatively attractive.” Even
where there are declarations and agreements asserting the
importance of the environment, or even the right to live
in a healthy environment, such declarations do not create
an international human right to a healthy environment
(Posner 2007; Atapattu 2002). Proponents of this viewpoint
believe this is the very definition of the normative
gap. While climate change infringes on human rights,
international law does not provide for how this harm can
be redressed. A climate change governance mechanism to
address this gap is therefore needed.
Equally important, an effective climate change governance
strategy requires international collaboration. This is because
“although the causes of climate change are located within
political borders, their effects clearly transcend them”
(Trebilcock 2014, 119). Two separate challenges come from
this reality. The first is that there is, as yet, no international
agreement on the best possible means of tackling climate
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change. While the UNFCCC does exist and serves a
specific purpose, it is considered to fall short of what is
required to tackle the challenge; hence, the COP meetings
that are aimed at achieving a deeper consensus. An
alternative framework such as Jutta Brunnee and Stephen
Toope’s “interactional theory” of the international system
could be helpful (Brunnee and Toope 2000), at least to the
extent that it breaks down the borders of the traditional
understanding of sources/legitimacy of international law.
Under this theory, what qualifies as international law in
the climate change context depends on whether a wide
enough range of actors and participants created it through
processes of mutual construction, and not only because it
fits traditional boundaries of international legality such as
treaties or custom (ibid.).
The second challenge is that the lack of international
consensus makes it more difficult to frame the harmful
impacts of climate change in the language of international
human rights. As Knox notes, none of the United Nations
human rights treaties enshrines a right to a healthy
environment or stipulates an environment of a certain
quality to meet a minimum threshold of healthfulness
(Knox 2015, 2). This concern could be addressed, as in the
first challenge above, by reference to Brunnee and Toope’s
interactional theory. Yet an awareness of the great efforts
being mobilized to ensure that a binding international
agreement is reached reveals the limitations of this theory
and raises further questions.
One such question is, what is the impact of the lack of
international agreement for international climate change
governance? Treaties are generally considered effective in
building international law on the environment and other
subject matters. By no means are treaties the only source
of international law, however. According to article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (annexed to
the Charter of the United Nations), international law can
arise from customary international law, meaning “general
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation” (Goldsmith and Posner 1999).
Additional sources of international law include general
principles of law and judicial decisions and teachings of
legal scholars.
Does the absence of an international environmental and
climate change treaty mean a diminished role for other
sources, such as customary international law (Bodansky
1995)? Not necessarily. Climate change governance is an
area in which the suggestion that treaties take priority
over other sources of international law cannot plausibly be
supported. This is especially true given that the existence
of a treaty is not always an effective guarantee that states
will comply with its provisions.
The simple answer to this question is that climate change
as a global problem is multidimensional in nature and
therefore requires a diversity of normative mechanisms
4 • CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION

to fight it. While those mechanisms may be treaty based,
other sources of international law, such as custom and
state practice, should not be discounted. In addition, and
on the basis of the interactional theory mentioned above,
attention has to shift further to alternative understandings
of international legal legitimacy incorporating the activities
of a diverse range of actors generating norms based in
large measure on rhetorical processes of discussion and
dialogue (Brunnee and Toope 2000).
There is, for example, a growing incidence of climate
change litigation in various domestic legal jurisdictions.
This can provide evidence of customary international
law through state practice. In these cases, combinations
of human rights and non-human-rights norms, such as
remedies under tort law, have been deployed (Cox 2014;
Schatz 2009; Newell 2008). Those parties that turn to
domestic litigation, often under human rights norms that
may not be explicit or clear, are acting partly in response
to weaknesses in the international regime (Hunter 2009).
Such litigations are significant in that they create a strategic
rhetorical process to deal with human rights and climate
change in the domestic context.
In addition, there are many international statements and
declarations that, while not directly addressing climate
change as a human rights issue, could be employed
interpretively to achieve that goal. Examples are the 1986
United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development
and the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples. The Declaration on the Right to
Development, for instance, recognizes the right to selfdetermination (article 1), which could be compromised
by loss of land arising from flooding or erosion. It also
enshrines the right of access to basic resources, education,
health services, food and housing (article 8), all of which
may be placed at risk by changes in traditional livelihood
arising from climatic factors such as change in disease
vectors and high-intensity storms (Center for International
Environmental Law 2015). Similarly, the Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples contains several
provisions under which climate change impacts could
become human rights questions. That declaration focuses
on the right to self-determination and adds the rights of
indigenous populations to autonomy and self-government
(article 4), these rights also oblige states to obtain the free,
prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples before
adopting measures that may affect them (article 19). Yet
these rights and obligations are often disregarded in the
climate change context.
Because litigators may have already accepted Posner’s
assertion that current international human rights norms
do not directly recognize claims arising from the impact
of climate change, it may be tempting to concentrate on
norms implied or derived from other sources rather
than on explicit human rights norms. That could be a
mistake, however, because the right to a remedy based

Climate Change and Human Rights: How? Where? When?
on such claims has been implied from other normative
sources. The provisions of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have in some
instances been expanded to support these claims. It has
been argued, for example, that while there is nothing in the
human right to life and to own property that directly refers
to the environment, “the existence of rights such as these
has justified in certain circumstances the need to protect
the environment” (Fisher 2013). The major regional human
rights instruments also directly or implicitly enshrine the
right to a healthy environment (Shelton 2009; Osofsky
2010). The relationship between the harms resulting from
climate change and the definition of a healthy environment
is one more issue open for debate.
Much as some regional human rights instruments recognize
environmental rights in their provisions (Kravchenko and
Bonine 2008; Shelton 2009), some national constitutions
have incorporated these rights as well. As of 2012, 177 of
the 193 member states of the United Nations recognized
the right to a healthy environment in one form or another
(Boyd 2012). This is true of African countries (Bosek 2014;
Madebwe 2015; Van der Bank and Van der Bank 2014) and
European countries (Falletti 2015). Not only do some Latin
American constitutions incorporate environmental rights,
they further provide that addressing climate change is a
responsibility of the state (Aguilar and Recio 2013).
In those countries whose constitutions enshrine the right
to a healthy environment, this is done either in explicit
terms, as in Portugal, Zimbabwe, Spain, among others
(Boyd 2012, 5) or through objectives and principles, as in
the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of
State Policy of Nigeria (Amechi 2010; Ijaiya and Joseph
2014; Temitope 2010; Musa and Bappah 2014). Under
the latter process of enshrinement, the right to a healthy
environment is only a policy vehicle. It cannot be legally
enforced in the way that civil and political rights can.
Despite the global push for recognition of the right to a
healthy environment, there are still exceptions — those
countries Boyd refers to as “laggards” — whose domestic
constitutions have ignored the right altogether (Boyd 2012,
4). Holdouts include Australia, Canada, China, Japan,
New Zealand and the United States.
International instruments and domestic constitutions
are two different vehicles through which environmental
human rights norms can be developed. When those
mechanisms contain provisions related to climate change,
an expectation is that the principle of “respecting all
human rights” will be included and adopted. The major
gap in the international system is that there is no specific
instrument addressing climate change. It is hoped that
such an instrument will emerge from COP 21, and that it
will enshrine provisions that are sensitive to the human
rights dimensions of climate change. Any such agreement
should be codified in unambiguous language, and target

not just procedural guarantees but also the substantive
human rights that are affected by climate change. With
regard to the rights to life and water, for example, the focus
could be on how shifts in climate and precipitation affect
access to water.
At the domestic level, it has also been the practice lately
of some national, subnational and corporate entities to
design policies that deal directly with the challenge posed
by climate change. As in international instruments or
domestic constitutions, these policies must respect human
rights in their provisions. Yet, as climate change is known
to affect different states differently, there will be a need
for contextual analysis, to determine what the potential
human rights implications of climate change are for each
state and to frame policies so they address those differing
implications. How this is being done in practice is the
question addressed in the next section.

EXAMPLES FROM NATIONAL,
SUBNATIONAL AND CORPORATE
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES
This paper is only one part of the overall research
that analyzes climate change policies and legislation
established by national, subnational and corporate entities
for language that meets the imperative of “respecting” all
human rights. Although some, like the mandate holders
who serve as advisers under the Special Procedures of
the UN Human Rights Council, go beyond the language
of “respect” to include the need to “protect, promote, and
fulfill” the human rights of all, this paper focuses on the
COP 21 requirement to “respect.” This is done with an
awareness that while “respect” can describe demands
made upon corporate entities, it may not sufficiently
capture the duties of states required to do more than respect
rights in climate change policies and laws. The preliminary
conclusion from reading some of these policies and laws is
that they avoid the use of direct human rights language.
Instead, they tend to employ alternative expressions that
may be normatively valuable, but are still not as effective
as more explicit human rights terms.
Canada’s Action on Climate Change is one such document. It
provides a summary of how the Canadian government has
responded to the threat of climate change (Government of
Canada 2015). It cannot be described as a plan, policy or
strategy. The document speaks to what the government
has done, not what it intends to do. It describes what
has been done to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
the government’s efforts to facilitate the production of
clean energy technologies and green infrastructure. It
also states how government action is helping Canadians
adapt to climate change, as well as the government’s role
in developing an international climate change agreement.
The document does not mention human rights, although
one might deduce a concern for human rights in the use
Basil Ugochukwu • 5
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of the word “fair” in the claim that “Canada is encouraged
by the progress made towards a new, fair and effective
international climate change agreement that includes
commitments from all major emitters.”
Earlier versions of Canadian climate change plans or air
quality plans included the Climate Change Plan for Canada
(Government of Canada 2002), launched in 2002 under
Jean Chretien’s Liberal government. It announced itself as
a plan that would “enable Canada to successfully meet its
climate change objectives,” which, at the time, included
supporting the UNFCCC, ratifying the Kyoto Protocol
and fulfilling Canada’s obligations under the protocol’s
terms. Yet, in its details, the plan struggled to balance
these goals against the pressures of assuring the economic
competitiveness of Canadian business and industry.
The plan noted some key principles in which
responsiveness to human rights should have been
embedded. It never once used the term “human rights”
but did mention “vulnerabilities.” It also included a few
provisions from which some procedural human rights
guarantees could be deduced. There was, for example, a
clause aimed at “promoting public participation through
education and outreach,” as well as another on the fair and
equitable sharing of the benefits and burdens of realizing
climate change goals (ibid., 9). Specifically in relation to the
Arctic, the plan recognized that the region is particularly
sensitive to changes in climate. It noted that the continued
decline of Arctic sea ice will not only “affect the global
climate system, but [will have] significant impacts on the
environment, well-being and lives of the peoples of the
circumpolar region, including Canada’s North” (ibid.,
51). The plan offered no further specific strategy for
incorporating these serious human rights concerns.
Following their victory over the Liberals in 2006, the
Conservatives under Prime Minister Stephen Harper
abandoned the 2002 plan and replaced it in 2007 with what
they described as a Regulatory Framework for Air Emissions
(Government of Canada 2007). As the title suggests, the
agenda was no longer a comprehensive climate change
plan but instead a regulatory framework for the narrower
subject of air quality. It included “mandatory and
enforceable reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases
and air pollutants that will deliver tangible benefits to the
health of Canadians and their environment” (ibid., iii). In
its preface, the framework noted that climate change is
a global issue “of major concern to Canadians” (ibid., 1).
It stated that the concentration of greenhouse gases due
to human activity is producing changes in the climate,
including “altered wind and precipitation patterns and the
increased incidence of extreme weather events, droughts,
and forest fires.” The framework emphasized how climate
changes “could imperil the way of life of vulnerable
communities around the world and here in Canada.”
Further, it stated that:
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Air pollution is a significant threat to human
health and the Canadian environment. Each year,
smog contributes to thousands of deaths [right to
life]. Other air pollution problems, such as acid
deposition, threaten biodiversity, forests and fresh
water ecosystems [rights to food, water, livelihood,
health]. In order to address the real concerns of
Canadians suffering from the health effects of
air pollution [right to health], and to clean up
Canada’s environment, the government must act to
reduce emissions of air pollutants. (Government of
Canada 2007) [Notes in brackets are the author’s.]
Thus, it is evident that this framework had an awareness
of the human rights concerns that could arise from climate
change, even if that specific language was again lacking.
The argument up to this point, however, is that using terms
from which human rights may be implied is not as effective
as actually indicating that a framework, plan or strategy
should be implemented in a way that supports human
rights (as well as detailing how it will do that). The 2007
framework was especially lacking in this regard. Because
the framework targeted only air pollution, however, it
cannot be described or analyzed as a comprehensive
climate change plan.
In the absence of a nationwide Canadian climate change
strategy, some provincial governments have stepped up
to lead local action. Some of the provinces have climate
change plans suited to their specific contexts. Of these,
the strategies for British Columbia and Quebec have
been widely acknowledged. In November 2015, Alberta
announced a province-wide carbon tax plan as part of its
climate change policy (Giovannetti and Jones 2015). For its
part, Ontario spent the early months of 2015 workshopping
its Climate Change Strategy, which mostly uses, rather
than “human rights,” the language of “vulnerabilities”
(Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change 2015).
While focusing on these vulnerabilities, the plan seeks
also to involve those facing climate risks in building
appropriate resilience. Like California’s plan (discussed
below), the Ontario plan acknowledges the diversity of
experience, knowledge and information on the subject.
Accordingly, the province intends to take advantage of the
traditional knowledge and distinct experiences of its First
Nation and Métis communities in crafting the next steps
for addressing climate change. In Ontario, as in California,
there is more inclination to deliberative, participatory
and consultative rights. These are all procedural rights
and thus they follow the international pattern, previously
discussed, of imagining the human rights dimension of
climate change only in procedural terms.
California’s 2009 Climate Adaptation Strategy speaks not
only in terms of “vulnerability” but also of the “public
stakeholder process” of communication and engagement
and of “environmental justice.” The California strategy
obliged all sectors engaged in its development to
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work closely with all stakeholders and to incorporate
environmental justice concerns and mainstream them
into all actions wherever possible. Further, it claimed that
the state’s climate adaptation strategies could assure for
all Californian residents the opportunity to live, learn
and work without regard to race, age, culture, income or
geographic location. It specifically noted that interactions
with California’s “Indian Tribes” were to be respectful and
on a “government-to-government basis.” The indigenous
community’s traditional knowledge was highlighted as
having a role in combatting climate change (California
Natural Resources Agency 2009).
Although there is no nationwide climate change policy
in Canada or the United States, that does not seem to be
the case in many states in the Global South. Governments
in these nations have been actively developing climate
change action plans intended for operationalization on
a national scale. The plans developed by Rwanda and
Nigeria are used as examples in this paper.
Rwanda’s Green Growth and Climate Resilience: National
Strategy for Climate Change and Low-Carbon Development
was released in 2011. Produced for a developing country,
Rwanda’s climate change agenda uses terms such as
“poverty and vulnerability,” “food and water security,”
“social protection” and “education and empowerment,”
but never “human rights” or “housing rights” or “social
and economic rights” (Republic of Rwanda 2011). Although
human rights principles could be implied from the terms
used in the plan, this is still less authoritative than if the
language used were more pointed in describing its basis
in human rights.
The Nigerian climate change strategy document seems to
be on a higher level in terms of its human rights content.
It uses the language of vulnerability, local knowledge and
experience, social marginalization and poor governance.
Each of these descriptions obviously has human rights
elements. But the Nigerian plan is also the only one among
those discussed here that actually uses the words “human
rights” in the text. It states that policies, programs and
strategies recommended for climate change adaptation
in the country should be guided by the five interrelated
principles of the United Nations Development Group,
that is, “a human rights-based approach, gender equality,
environmental sustainability, result-based management,
and capacity building” (Government of Nigeria 2011).
In one area at least, the Nigerian plan further defines
what a human rights-centred approach might mean in
practice. It not only established well-articulated goals
for climate change adaptation for vulnerable groups
(“to develop programs that support and assist…to
harness opportunities”), but also had clear strategies
(“create awareness…provide basic training…adapt
government
programs…adapt
public
facilities…
intensify immunization…retrain health workers…

[and] encourage [non-governmental groups] to provide
social welfare services”). Furthermore, it makes specific
recommendations in terms of policies, programs and other
measures by identified actors that can help vulnerable
groups adapt to climate change.
In recent times, the corporate sector has also been involved
in climate change-related activities, and some companies
have developed environmental sustainability plans with
climate adaptation and mitigation as critical components.
As with the national and subnational plans discussed
above, it is important to ask how corporate environmental
and climate change plans are integrating human rights
concerns. While these corporate plans come under the
broad rubric of the “environmental,” they could encompass
significant climate change elements as well.
Canada’s Bank of Montreal (BMO), for example, has what
it calls an Environmental Policy and Action Plan with a
particular sensitivity to the “problems posed by climate
change,” which problems, it says, need prompt and strong
action. Only once does this plan mention “human rights,”
and that is under the summary of the bank’s five-program
“ECO Strategy,” specifically in the section dealing
with procurement. There it states, as its overarching
objective, the employment of “a rigorous process that
will ensure BMO takes into account environmental and
social considerations during the procurement process.”
It then notes that the program “takes a wider view of the
concept of sustainability to include social concerns (for
example, labour practices and human rights) in addition
to environmental issues” (BMO Financial Group 2008).
Power generation and distribution companies are often
implicated in the climate change debate because their
activities contribute significantly to greenhouse gas
emissions. In addition, these companies frequently carry
on their business in proximity to indigenous communities
whose rights and interests over the land, culture and
resources have to be included in corporate accountability
measures. It is obvious, therefore, that these companies
should conduct their activities in a participatory and prorights manner to gain the trust and support of the members
of such communities. Specifically, if power companies have
designed climate change or other environmental policies,
the human rights of the communities affected or likely
to be affected by their businesses should be integrated
into such policies. To see the extent to which this is being
carried out in practice are the following analyses of several
Canadian power companies: Imperial Oil and ExxonMobil
(operating as a single company), Hydro One and Enbridge.
The environmental policy document of Imperial Oil and
ExxonMobil is less explicit than that of BMO. It speaks
first to both organizations conducting their business “in a
manner that is compatible with the balanced environmental
and economic needs of the communities in which they
operate.” The policy then states the goals of complying
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with applicable environmental laws and regulations,
preventing incidents and controlling emissions and
wastes, as well as communicating with the public on
environmental matters and sharing their experience
with others to facilitate improvements in performance
(Imperial Oil and ExxonMobil n.d.). It would appear that
the standard adopted is minimalistic — limited to ensuring
compliance with environmental law — and there is little
to indicate a commitment to address climate change more
holistically.
Hydro One is Ontario’s largest power transmission and
distribution company. Its terse environmental policy is so
general that it does not once mention climate change, let
alone human rights. To infer either of these from the very
broad terms used in this one-page policy would require
imaginative reading between the lines. The policy simply
states that the company will manage its operations “in
an environmentally responsible manner” and (much like
Imperial Oil and ExxonMobil above) “will comply with
all applicable environmental legislation and…voluntary
commitments.” While committing to designing and
operating its facilities in a manner that prevents pollution,
the company also pledged to “manage any adverse
environmental impacts” that may result from those
activities. As well, it undertook to “manage significant
environmental risks and integrate environmental
considerations into [its] decisions” (Hydro One 2015).
Hydro One is particularly concerned about its relationship
to the First Nations and Métis peoples, since it owns assets
in reserve lands as well as within the traditional territories
of these communities. The company states that it is
committed to developing and maintaining relationships
with First Nations and Métis peoples that demonstrate
mutual respect for one another. It also recognizes that First
Nations and Métis peoples and their lands are unique
to Canada, with distinct legal, historical and cultural
significance. It therefore committed itself to working with
First Nations and Métis peoples in a spirit of cooperation
and shared responsibility (ibid.).
For its part, Enbridge has a climate change policy
document that acknowledges that “dealing with climate
change is a shared responsibility with implications for
citizens, governments and business.” The major focus
of the policy is on reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
However, its most significant prescription in this regard
is that government policies should be “tailored to our
energy-intensive and energy-based economy [which] must
enable us to remain competitive while making meaningful
reductions to GHG emissions.” Apart from the emissions
reduction and pro-economy concentration of this policy, it
is only mildly sensitive to the social dimension and makes
no mention of human rights at all. Very little, if anything, can
be inferred from its statement that “Enbridge is prepared to
work with all levels of government and key associations to
encourage the energy industry to be a proactive participant
8 • CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION

in the development and implementation of climate change
solutions” (Enbridge n.d.).
Both the Hydro One and Enbridge policies use very broad
and general descriptions, and no direct references to
human rights. The Hydro One policy, however, contains
words from which some human rights principles could be
inferred, if one were to read between the lines. Its promise
to conduct its activities in an environmentally responsible
manner could convey a range of possible meanings. It could
mean that the company would carry out environmental
assessments before implementing new projects and also
doing those projects in a manner that limits their impacts
on the environment. It is conceivable that, when this is
the case, a host of procedural and substantive human
rights could be protected in the process. The company’s
concern for the interests of indigenous peoples in affected
communities is particularly salient in this regard. Its
recognition of the uniqueness and historical significance
of First Nations and Métis peoples’ lands suggests that the
company is also concerned for the protection of indigenous
cultural and traditional rights.
The Enbridge policy, by contrast, though it mentions
climate change specifically, contains insufficient detail to
warrant the inference of a commitment to human rights.
The company’s pledge to work with governments and
associations toward climate change solutions is clearly
not enough, although an optimist might see a desire to be
consultative and participatory. If this is the case, it could
be concluded that at least the company is interested in
ensuring that procedural human rights expectations are
respected in its strategy.
Most of the goals contained in the corporate policies
addressed here could be interpreted to include some
human rights expectations. For example, environmental
laws could plausibly enshrine human rights norms.
Preventing oil spills and controlling emissions would
seem to be proactive ways of preventing tragedies that
could have human rights implications. Conducting public
communications on environmental matters also fits the
strategy of using public dialogue to engage communities at
risk of environmental disruptions, providing an important
procedural means to protect human rights. However, if
the exact human rights objectives of these companies in
these policies can be discovered only by deducing them
from inexact, unspecific language, it means more clarity
is needed. This can only be achieved by ensuring that the
policies use actual human rights language.

CONCLUSION
As the parties to the UNFCCC gather in Paris in December
2015 to adopt the final version of the international climate
change framework, at the heart of the negotiations should
be how human rights principles can guide policies aimed
at mitigating the challenges of climate change. It is likely
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that the final document will require state parties to ensure
all human rights are “respected” in their climate change
actions. If that is the case, specific details of how human
rights principles can inform climate change strategies will
have to be worked into policies at the national, subnational
and corporate levels. There is therefore an immediate need
to translate the text proposal in ways that integrate human
rights into practical actions in specific climate change
policies.
As discussed, many countries, especially in the developing
world, have developed climate change policy documents
to guide their national response actions. There are other
states, such as Canada, that do not have documented
national policies, but have nevertheless submitted
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions aimed
at achieving the objectives of the framework convention.
Corporations are also showing sensitivity to climate
change issues, either as part of their corporate social
responsibility strategies or as a risk consideration in
investment planning. Either by design or omission, many
of these policies do not use the language of human rights.
If the international climate change regime is to achieve its
objectives of reducing emissions and building resilience,
this gap has to be corrected quickly. An international
agreement or instrument may not anticipate the entire
gamut of ways in which climate change could be a human
rights concern. It may therefore be acceptable if such
an agreement or instrument makes broad and general
provisions. Where this is the case, it is left to domestic
policy makers to translate such broad international
commitments to actionable domestic strategies. In doing
so, domestic policy makers should ensure that the actions
chosen for implementation actually address climate
change in a manner that is sensitive to human rights.
The language of these policies — international, domestic,
national, subnational and corporate — should leave no
doubt that this is the case by using the language of human
rights in their provisions.
Applying this to Canada, for example, would require an
understanding of the various ways that climate change
could have an impact on human rights throughout Canada.
Collective information gathering and sharing could create
a platform for meaningful action. If the public education
is conducted in a collaborative manner — involving
national, subnational and corporate stakeholders,
indigenous communities and other relevant stakeholders
— each stakeholder could then design their climate change
policies in a fashion that recognizes the human rights
issues relevant to their sector and the reality of Canada’s
domestic context. This approach should apply to all other
countries as well.
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A Climate Change Litigation Precedent: Urgenda
Foundation v The State of the Netherlands
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Roger Cox
In June 2015, The Hague District Court rendered
a historic judgment in the climate case of Urgenda
Foundation v The State of the Netherlands, stating
that the Dutch state commits “a tort of negligence”
by not adequately regulating and curbing greenhouse
gas emissions. Roger Cox, lead counsel for Urgenda,
presents his account of the case and the ruling,
which marks the first successful climate change
action founded in tort law — and a landmark
precedent for such cases in other jurisdictions
around the globe.
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CLIMATE CHANGE SOLIDARITY
AND RESOLVE

POST-PARIS STRATEGY, POLICY AND LAW
TO TRANSLATE AMBITION INTO ACTION
Oonagh Fitzgerald

With the recent federal election, Canada is poised to make a fresh start in addressing climate change. Research and experimentation
has already occurred at the subnational (provincial and municipal) level and within civil society, which will support the new
federal government in making ambitious commitments on behalf of Canada — commitments that Canadians are resolved
to meet or exceed. CIGI’s International Law Research Program (ILRP)1 has identified key international, transnational and
domestic legal approaches that will help to implement successfully an ambitious new climate change agenda.
The twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), being held in Paris from November 30 to December 11, is expected to articulate guiding principles and
set the level of global ambition around climate change. The real work, however, will come afterward, in translating general
ideas into strategies, policies and laws that actually change behaviour. This will have to be done at international, transnational,
national and subnational levels, with appropriate coordination across jurisdictions as necessary.
The global crisis of climate change cannot be solved without taking a holistic approach that integrates and supports the global
Sustainable Development Goals2 (SDGs) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in September of this year. Consistent
with the SDGs, the ILRP’s research on climate change strategies, policies and laws can be grouped under three themes:
• addressing equality and climate justice;
• facilitating global sharing of innovation and prosperity; and
• promoting global cooperation and solidarity.
This commentary summarizes how senior fellows and researchers within CIGI’s ILRP will contribute to creating effective climate
change strategies, policies and laws consistent with and supportive of global SDGs.

EQUALITY AND CLIMATE JUSTICE
The problem: Indigenous people everywhere are seeing their right to food security and traditional culture increasingly
adversely affected by climate change. Future generations will bear a heavier, potentially intolerable, burden if the present
generation does not take adequate steps to address climate change. While climate change is making the general population
vulnerable, it is important to consider the particular impacts felt by those who already are most vulnerable: women and
girls, the elderly, disabled and impoverished persons. Small island nations will disappear entirely if climate change is
not checked. SDGs 1–5 focus on basic human rights issues long enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human Rights, and
subsequent conventions. Goal 16 acknowledges that rights are empty unless citizens can participate in decisions affecting
them and can enforce their rights through an accessible system of justice.
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Thus, indigenous rights, intergenerational fairness, protection of vulnerable populations and global equity issues need to be
taken into account in designing international, national and subnational strategies to address climate change (Bianca Jagger,
Basil Ugochukwu). At the international level, this means humanitarian solutions must be mobilized for populations displaced
from their homes by climate change-related disasters.
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When Co2 Goes to Geneva: Taxing Carbon
Across Borders —Without Violating WTO
Obligations
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Maria Panezi
Carbon taxes are relevant to international trade
when they are coupled with border tax adjustment
(BTA) legislation for imported products. BTAs are
intended to level the playing field between domestic
and foreign products. Such tax schemes, if not
designed properly, however, can be found to violate a
country’s international commitments before the World
Trade Organization (WTO). This paper argues that
environmentally conscious governments can design
a WTO-compatible BTA to offset domestic CO2
legislation.

Commentary
Oonagh Fitzgerald
Senior fellows and researchers within CIGI’s ILRP
will contribute to creating effective climate change
strategies, policies and laws consistent with global
Sustainable Development Goals in the areas of
addressing equality and climate justice; facilitating
global sharing of innovation and prosperity; and
promoting global cooperation and solidarity.
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Access to and timely diffusion of green technologies
required for climate change adaptation and
mitigation are among the major challenges
faced by the international community. The role
of the patent system has become the subject of
increased attention in climate change discussions
on technology transfer. New mechanisms for
collaborative innovation are required to foster the
green technology sector.
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The International Law Research Program (ILRP) of
the Centre for International Governance Innovation
(CIGI) responds to select questions from Ontario’s
Climate Change Discussion Paper 2015, as part of
a province-wide public consultation process by the
Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change.
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The Paris Conference of the Parties 2015 is designed
to produce the next round of climate change action.
There are reasons to believe that the chances for
success at the multilateral level are better now
that they were before, but even under the most
optimistic scenarios, Paris will not be the end of
the negotiations. The Paris summit will be crucial to
maintaining the momentum that has been building
in the private sector and civil society on the issue of
climate change.
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